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THE STATUS OF PROMISSORY NOTES
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
INTRODUCTION
The status of promissory notes as securities within the meaning
of the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 is an oft-litigated question which has confounded both practi-
tioners and academicians. Until recently, courts commonly adhered
to the seemingly explicit definitional provisions of both statutes,
finding almost all notes to be securities.3 Today, a literal construc-
tion of the statutory language defining security to include "any
note' 4 is viewed as impractical and unwarranted in light of the
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3 See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969),
wherein the court stated that the "definition of a security has been literally read by the
judiciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be securities." Id. at 991-92; accord,
Llanos v. United States, 209 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
1 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) provides:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) provides in part:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note. . . but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
It should be noted that while the definitional provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts vary
slightly, they are considered identical for antifraud purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
Individuals incurring financial losses and alleging fraud on the part of promoters or
issuers of various instruments often seek relief under the securities acts in the federal courts.
Where the sole basis of jurisdiction is the existence of a transaction involving a security, the
court must, as a threshold determination, decide whether the particular instrument is a
security. See Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954) wherein the court observed
that "[t]o bring an action for damages [under the antifraud provisions] within the jurisdic-
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primary goals and policies underlying the federal securities legisla-
tion.' In attempting to depart from the earlier literal view, many
courts have relied upon the definitional preambles of the Acts,
which extend the scope of the definitions throughout the statutes
"unless the context otherwise requires."' Pursuant to this latter
phrase, the courts have sought to effectuate the presumed intent of
Congress by examining carefully the context in which a promissory
note is exchanged to determine whether the noteholder is entitled
to the protection of federal securities law.7 Predictably, because of
the lack of express congressional direction in the matter, courts have
differed in their analyses of these transactions, and various ap-
proaches have evolved to determine whether a given note falls
within the definition of a security.8
tion of a federal court on other than diversity grounds, the action must be one to enforce some
liability or duty created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . ." Id. at 789. The
plaintiffs in Beury failed to allege conduct which violated a duty under the Act. Analogous
to a failure to allege actionable conduct is the allegation of conduct which otherwise would
have been actionable had the instrument properly been classified a security. Cf. ITT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (manufacture of fraudulent securities in the United
States for export sufficient to sustain subject matter jurisdiction). With the demise of the
literalist view, see notes 11-26 and accompanying text infra, the importance of a relatively
uniform standard, one that injects a greater degree of predictability for making this determi-
nation, has become increasingly apparent. See Note, Bank Loans as Securities, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 440, 441 (1977). See generally Long, Introduction, Interpreting the Statutory Defini-
tion of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96 (1974); Pollock,
Notes Issued in Syndicated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32 Bus. LAw. 537 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Pollock].
5 An examination of the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts reveals that Con-
gress intended only investment transactions to be included within the statutory coverage. See
notes 16-22 and accompanying text infra. In recognition of this fact, courts have utilized the
doctrine of "equitable interpretation" to restrict the literal expression of the statute according
to the spirit and policy of the legislation. See notes 27-65 and accompanying text infra. See
generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54.03 (4th ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
' Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Many courts which have rejected the literal
approach have relied upon this language. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-38 (2d Cir. 1976); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
1 See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) (promissory note given in
exchange for loan, proceeds of which were used to promote a business venture, is a security);
Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974) (six-month bank note is not a
security); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973) (demand note issued by parent corporation with term less than 9 months, collateral-
ized with stock of subsidiary corporation, is a security). See generally Lipton & Katz, "Notes"
Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763, 770-71 (1975).
8Tests which have been employed by courts in determining tfe extent to which promis-
sory notes are covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts generally include the literalist approach,
see notes 11-15 and accompanying text infra, and an "economic realities" or "context-over-
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While certain fundamental principles are common to many of
the judicially developed approaches,9 each technique has its own
distinguishing features, areas of emphasis, and shortcomings. 0 It is
suggested that to most effectively implement a context-oriented
method of analysis, criteria gleaned from a bulk of case law should
be utilized collectively to identify those transactions which Congress
intended to be within the purview of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. It is
the purpose of this Note to discuss the treatment historically af-
forded promissory notes under the securities laws and, through ex-
amination of various authorities, to isolate those factors that hope-
fully may serve as the basis of a test which is flexible in application,
yet which promotes predictability and uniformity of result.
THE DEMISE OF THE LITERAL APPROACH
The departure from a literal reading of the statutory definition
of a security has occurred in part because of the wide range of
transactions which may involve the transfer of a promissory note.
Although promissory notes are basically written declarations in
which individuals pledge to pay a specific amount of money at a
specified time," these unilateral instruments are drafted and ex-
changed in many different forms, in many dissimilar contexts, and
text" test under which an evaluation is made of the transaction underlying the issuance of
the note. See notes 27-65 and accompanying text infra. See generally Pollock, supra note 4,
at 539-50.
1 A significant amount of case law and commentary has dealt in depth with the general
policy considerations underlying the federal securities laws. See SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), wherein the Court described the fundamental
purpose of all six major federal securities acts as the substitution of "a philosophy of full
disclosure for [that] of caveat emptor [in order] to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry." Id. at 186. Embodied in this policy is the goal of both the
1933 and 1934 Acts of protecting the public, and particularly the investor, from fraudulent
or speculative schemes of promoters. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See notes 27-65 and accompanying
text infra.
10 The various courts of appeals do not all agree upon the factors which should be weighed
in evaluating whether a particular item is a security. This divergence has led to the develop-
ment of a number of tests, each of which reflects a particular court's view of the essential
elements of a security transaction. As a result, similar situations may produce contradictory
holdings in different courts as to the applicability of the federal securities laws. Compare
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976), with Great W. Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
,1 Slight variations of the basic definition of a note have been articulated in judicial
decisions. See, e.g., Aetna Oil Co. v. Glenn, 53 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Ky. 1944); Kirkland v.
Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 155 S.E.2d 701 (1967). See generally Comment, Notes as Securities
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD. L. REv.
233, 236 n.13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Notes as Securities].
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among a wide variety of parties.12 Most common among the various
types of promissory notes are the following: instruments given by an
individual in exchange for a loan, ranging from the simple I.O.U.
to the sophisticated installment purchase agreement; "debt obliga-
tions"'' 3 which are utilized by corporations and other enterprises for
general financing purposes and constitute the foundation of the cap-
ital structure of many business entities; and short term unsecured
promissory notes known collectively as "commercial paper'."' 4 A lit-
eral construction of the definitional provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts would result in the inclusion of all promissory notes otherwise
within the scope of the statutes without regard to the nature of the
underlying transaction in which the notes are exchanged.'5
"2 See generally Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene Security-A Search for
the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ham-
mett].
,3 Debt obligations often are utilized extensively while a corporation is in its organiza-
tional stages. For a brief discussion of the function of debt in corporate financing see W. CARY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoR~oPRTIONS 115-17 (abr. 4th ed. 1970).
" One early and often-cited definition of commercial paper includes within the meaning
of that term "[b]ills of exchange, promissory notes, bank-checks, and other negotiable
instruments for the payment of money, which, by their form and on their face, purport to be
such instruments as are, by the law-merchant, recognized as falling under the designation of
'commercial paper.'" BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNJAY 338 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citation omitted). For
an in depth examination of the functions of commercial paper in the securities area, see
Hicks, Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 227 (1976). The definitional provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
differ significantly with respect to commercial paper. Under the 1934 Act short-term notes
are specifically excluded from the definition of a security, subject to the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language. Id. at 228. See generally Schweitzer, Commercial Paper and
the Securities Act of 1933: A Role for Registration, 63 GEo. L.J. 1245 (1975); Comment, The
Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav. 362 (1972).
,1 The number of transactions in the ordinary course of business which involve promis-
sory notes is quite large. On a practical level, this fact militates in favor of an interpretation
which limits the applicability of the securities laws to certain delineated types of notes and
thus spares the already congested federal court calendars from inundation with 10b-5 claims
arising from small private commercial transactions. One student commentator has stated
that "one must question whether anything but the most unequivocal congressional mandate
should dictate the introduction to the federal courts of a substantial class of cases tradition-
ally tried in state forums." Comment, The Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1975 Aaiz. ST. L.J. 175, 182. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689
(3d Cir. 1973). The Lino court pointed out that "[t]o accept [the literal] argument would
mean that any consumer who bought an article 'on time' and issued a note would be able to
sue in a federal court on the theory that the retailer had purchased his 'security.' "Id. at 695.
Accord, Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), wherein the
court noted that under a literal construction of the definitional provision, "jurisdiction could
be invoked with respect to any claim of fraud in connection with the issuance of a check or
note, no matter how small the transaction (e.g., the purchase of an automobile or refrigera-
tor), provided the mails or some other instrumentality of interstate commerce were used
... " Id. at 808.
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When viewed against the backdrop of the legislative history of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as well as the intended regulatory and
remedial benefits of the legislation, this literal approach appears
unjustified." The primary purpose behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts
was to protect the investing public from the types of abuses and
unfair practices which preceded the economic depression of the late
1920's.17 The Supreme Court has observed that securities legislation
was enacted to eliminate abuses in a previously unregulated market
and that the intended focus of the legislation was upon securities
sold to raise capital for profitmaking purposes. 8 Thus, according to
the Court, Congress intended the application of the Acts to hinge
upon the "economic realities" of the underlying transactions and
directed the thrust of the statutes toward the prevention of fraud
and the protection of investors. 9 This interpretation is supported by
congressional reports accompanying the 1933 and 1934 Acts wherein
continual emphasis was placed on the Acts' coverage of
"investment" instruments and transactions. 21 Consequently, it has
16 In many instances, the literal interpretation of a statute will be extended or restricted
"to include situations which would reasonably have been contemplated by the legislature in
light of the background and purposes giving impetus to the legislation." 2A SUTHERLAD,
supra note 5, at § 54.05. Thus, although the statutory language may appear unambiguous, if
a literal interpretation of the law leads to an absurd result or is inconsistent with legislative
purpose, the express words must be modified so as to be harmonious with legislative intent.
Id., at §§ 46.01-.07; 3 id. at §§ 60.01, 60.03.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1933). According to Sutherland, an accurate assessment of legislative history
should include "information concerning the activities of pressure groups, economic conditions
in the country during times when the legislation in question was under consideration, prevail-
ing business practices, and the prior state of the law .... " 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 5,
at § 48.04. It has been said that the securities legislation and regulations were precipitated
to a large degree by "underlying social and ec3nomic elements, such as the rise of the great
national corporation, the separation of ownership from control, the diffusion of share owner-
ship among an increasing segment of the population, and . . . [the] vast share of the
national wealth represented by corporate securities .. " Loomis, The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 214-15
(1959).
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
Id. Relying upon the language of an earlier decision, the Court in Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), stated that the term "security" "embodies a flexible rather than
a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."
389 U.S. at 338 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)). This view of the
1934 Act has been reiterated in numerous subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Superintendent v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), wherein the Court stated that § 10(b) of the 1934
Act is read "to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the
purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face."
Id. at 12.
" See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
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been convincingly maintained by numerous authorities that the sta-
tutory language defining security should not be literally construed'2
as Congress was not concerned with exercising regulatory control
over either personal or strictly commercial promissory notes,22 but
rather with protecting the public in investment-oriented transac-
tions.
Absent congressional mandate to the contrary, it now appears
that the literal approach to construction of the definitional sections
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts has been dealt its death blow by the
Supreme Court, which rejected the theory outright in United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.2s In Forman, which involved a de-
termination as to the status under the securities laws of shares in a
public cooperative apartment, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit apparently had injected new life into the literalist view. The
Second Circuit panel had held that such shares were securities
within the meaning of the federal securities laws, reasoning that "if
a given instrument is a share of stock 'on its face' it is literally within
the ambit of the statute."24 Although the Second Circuit recognized
the principle of "substance over form," it posited that this maxim
should be utilized only to extend and not to restrict the coverage of
2' See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp.
670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), discussed in 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 324 (1944). Notwithstanding the
fact that the Joiner Court stated that "[i]nstruments may be included within any of [the
Acts'] definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description,"
320 U.S. at 351, the Forman Court found that Joiner did not adopt the literal approach to
the definitional sections of the statutes. The Forman Court explained that by
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in . . . dicta the [Joiner] Court
made clear that it was not establishing an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the
economic realities underlying a transaction . . . . [but rather] intended only to
make the rather obvious point that. . . most instruments bearing these traditional
titles are likely to be covered by the statutes.
421 U.S. at 850 (footnote omitted).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933), discussed in Comment,
Commercial Notes and Definitions of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A
Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 487 n.36 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Commercial Notes].
421 U.S. 837 (1975), rev'g Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.
1974).
21 500 F.2d at 1252. The court stated that "[ilt would be anomalous. . . were one who
was defrauded as to the nature of the instrument, 'stock' on its face, to be deprived of
antifraud provisions directed at 'stock' transactions." Id.
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the Acts.25 Emphasizing, once again, that the courts must look to
the economic realities of the transaction, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Second Circuit's ruling that the cooperative shares were
securities, thereby rejecting a strictly literal construction of the
statutory definition." It is submitted that in the wake of the
Forman decision, the question is not whether a promissory note is
a security, but rather in which instances will a promissory note be
deemed a security.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE LITERAL APPROACH
Those courts which have rejected the literal approach for the
most part have relied upon the "unless the context otherwise re-
quires" language as indicative of congressional intent to include
within the purview of the securities laws only investment-oriented
transactions and not every transaction involving a note. 2 As a con-
sequence, judicial initiative has been directed towards the fashion-
ing of a test which would identify readily those contexts which are
sufficiently investment-oriented to render the promissory note a
security.28 The Supreme Court was presented with its first oppor-
2 Id. at 1253.
2 421 U.S. at 837. The District Court for the Southern District of New York initially had
held that cooperative housing shares did not become securities merely because the shares
were designated as stock. See 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Furthermore,
according to the district court, "the fundamental nonprofit nature of th[e] transaction
[presented an] . . . insurmountable barrier to" the argument that the transaction involved
securities. Id. at 1128 (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that
labeling the shares as stock rendered them securities within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. The Second Circuit did go on to note, however, that even if a profit-seeking venture
were required in order for federal securities laws to apply, profits in this transaction were
present in the form of reduced rents, tax benefits, and income produced from the commercial
facilities of the development. 500 F.2d at 1254-55. Relying on Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) in which it was stated "a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers," id. at 459, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and
thereby refused to be confined by the literal language of the statutes. 421 U.S. at 849. While
observing that the name attached to an instrument is not wholly irrelevant, the Court stressed
that the application of the securities laws should turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction and that the protection of federal law should not be extended to purchasers of
"stock" who intended only to acquire a residential apartment in a state-subsidized coopera-
tive and had not invested for profit. Id. at 851.
11 But see Hammett, supra note 12, at 38-40; Notes as Securities, supra note 11, at 239,
wherein the author argues that the "proper construction appears to be that 'context' refers
to the context of the statute."
28 It should be noted that the tests which have been devised for determining whether a
particular transaction is governed by the securities laws have not all arisen in the context of
promissory note transactons. The definitional dilemma also is present in situations involving
the meaning of "stock" and "investment contract," as well as any note. See, e.g., United
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tunity to construe the definitional section of the 1934 Act in
Teherepnin v. Knight,9 which involved the issue whether withdraw-
able capital shares constitute securities within the meaning of the
1934 Act.30 Pointing to the long-standing canon of statutory con-
struction that remedial legislation should be construed liberally to
effectuate its purposes, the Tcherepnin Court held that "in search-
ing for the meaning and scope of the word security in the Act, form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality."3 1 Finding that the issuance of withdrawable capi-
tal shares was a means of raising funds and that the shares in ques-
tion most closely resembled investment contracts, the Court held
them to constitute securities within the'meaning of the 1934 Act.2
This "substance over form" or "economic realities" method of
analysis had been central to the Supreme Court's oft-cited decision
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.33 In that case, the Court found that "an
offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a con-
tract for cultivating, marketing, and remitting the net proceeds to
the investor"34 was an investment contract within the scope of the
1933 Act. Rejecting the view that a name or description appearing
on the face of an instrument should be dispositive of the issue, the
Howey Court articulated the substance over form approach later
employed in Tcherepnin.35 The Court stated that in order to deter-
mine whether an exchange is of the kind Congress intended to regu-
late, the events surrounding the transaction should be examined
carefully. 6 To guide courts and practitioners in making this deter-
mination, the Howey Court laid down a three-pronged test: under
the Securities Act of 1933, an investment contract is "a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (stock); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293 (1946) (investment contract); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126
(2d Cir. 1976) (promissory note). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
precise issue whether all transactions involving promissory notes are governed by the federal
securities laws and hence has not yet expressly rejected the literal approach in a promissory
note situation.
" 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
Id. at 333-34.
31 Id. at 336.
32 Id. at 338.
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
, Id. at 294. The Court pointed out that "[each prospective customer is offered both
a land sales contract and a service contract . . . . While the purchaser is free to make
arrangements with other service companies, . . . 85% of the acreage sold . . . was covered
by service contracts with defendant." Id. at 295.
Id. at 300.
:' Id. at 298-99.
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common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party . . . ."3 This standard has sur-
vived to the present time with but one slight modification; instead
of requiring that the profits result solely from the efforts of others,
the test apparently now is satisfied if the profits result substan-
tially from the efforts of others .3  The Howey test has come to be
viewed as "embod[ying] the essential attributes that run through
all of the Court's decisions defining security. The touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others. '39
A different version of the economic realities approach was em-
ployed in McClure v. First National Bank0 and Lino v. City Invest-
ing Co." In McClure, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with the
question whether the exchange of a promissory note and trust deed
for a bank loan amounts to the transfer of a security.2 The Third
Circuit in Lino addressed the issue whether the purchase of two
franchise sales center licensing agreements for which payment was
made partially in cash and partially with promissory notes involved
the purchase of a security. 3 Relying upon the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language of the 1933 and 1934 Acts' definitional
sections, both the McClure and Lino courts held that Congress in-
tended only "investment," and not "commercial" notes to be within
the ambit of those Acts." Unfortunately, in enunciating this varia-
37 Id.
I See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83-(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973);
note 110 infra.
I United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). But see Hannan &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974), where the authors contend that "[t]he definition of the term
'security' as used in the principal federal securities laws, is for the most part one of the best
kept secrets in recent legal history."
4- 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
41 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
"2 497 F.2d at 491.
11 487 F.2d at 690.
14 497 F.2d at 492; 487 F.2d at 694-95. The Lino court concluded that the context of the
transaction required a finding that a purchase of a security was not involved. The court stated
that "[tlhese were personal promissory notes issued by a private party. There was no public
offering of the notes, and the issuer was the person claiming to be defrauded. The notes were
not procured for speculation or investment .... " 487 F.2d at 694-95. The investment-
commercial dichotomy recognized in these cases has received extensive analysis by the com-
mentators. See, e.g., Lipton & Katz, "Notes" are not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAw. 763
(1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" are (are not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAW.
861 (1974); Pollock, supra note 4.
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tion of the economic realities test, the courts failed to propose de-
tailed working definitions of the terms "commercial" and
"investment," prompting critics of these decisions to argue that the
commercial-investment dichotomy merely serves to confuse rather
than clarify the issue.4 5 It must be noted, however, that while nei-
ther McClure nor Lino enunciated clear and decisive formulae, both
courts did suggest certain factors which serve to distinguish invest-
ment from commercial transactions. For instance, the McClure
panel, in deciding that the notes in question were commercial in
nature, emphasized that these instruments were "neither offered to
[a] . . . class of investors, nor were they acquired . . . for specula-
tion or investment."46 Similarly, the Lino court justified its refusal
to find a purchase of securities by pointing to the lack of a public
offering and the absence of any indication that the instruments were
"procured for speculation or investment. ' 47
Still another facet of the substance over form test surfaced in
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,4 wherein the California Su-
preme Court considered the definition of a security within the
meaning of that state's securities law. The Silver Hills case involved
the sale of charter memberships to finance the organization and
construction of a private country club. Individuals purchasing these
memberships were entitled to the use of the club's facilities, but
were not entitled to share in the profits or income of the club. 9
Deeming this transaction to be one not involving a security, the
Silver Hills court emphasized that two elements were necessary for
'" See Hammett, supra note 12, at 41, 59-61, wherein the author argued that the latent
ambiguity of the investment-commercial test is clearly visible in situations involving bank
loans. The Fifth Circuit has taken the position that no transaction involving a bank loan
involves the transfer of a security within the scope of the 1933 and 1934- Acts. See, e.g.,
McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974), wherein the court stated that
"[a] commercial bank's business is lending money not trading in securities." In-Great W.
Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit,
citing McClure, disagreed stating that "[lt is not enough to conclude ipse dixit: 'A commer-
cial bank's business is lending money not trading in securities' . . . [since] banks may and
do trade in securities." (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit conceded, however, that promis-
sory notes "given to a bank in the course of a commercial financing transaction" are not
securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws: "To expand the reach of those
acts to ordinary commercial loan transactions would distort congressional purpose as we
interpret it." Id. at 1260. It would appear equally contrary to congressional intent, however,
to exclude from the coverage of the securities acts all notes received by banks without a
careful examination of the nature of each individual transaction. See notes 112-13 and accom-
panying text infra.
" 497 F.2d at 493.
' 487 F.2d at 694-95.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
Id. at 812, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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a security to exist: First, an investor must furnish initial value, and
second, he must simultaneously assume the risk of possible loss of
that value through operation of the promoter's enterprise." Appro-
priately designated the "risk-capital" approach, the Silver Hills test
is based on the court's belief that risk to one's initial investment is
the most significant characteristic of a security.5' The risk-capital
analysis recently was applied in the federal arena by the Ninth
Circuit in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz.52 In holding that a
renewable note received in connection with a loan agreement did not
constitute a security, the Great Western court suggested that the
factors involved in determining whether a lender has invested risk
capital in return for a security include time of mAturity of the note,
the existence and extent of collateralization, the circumstances of
issuance, the relationship between the amount borrowed and the
size of the borrower's business, as well as the contemplated use of
the proceeds.53
The Supreme Court's most recent opportunity to address the
Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188. The Silver Hills rationale is discussed
and analyzed in Note, The Definition of a Security Under the California Corporate Securities
Law of 1968: The Risk Capital Test, 6 PAc. L.J. 683, 689-99 (1975).
" The core of the Silver Hills rationale later was incorporated into the often-cited defini-
tion of a security formulated by Professor Coffey. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a
"Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Ras. L. RFv. 367, 377 (1967).
Professor Coffey's formula states:
A "security" is:
(1) A transaction in which
(2) a person ("buyer") furnishes value ("initial value") to another ("seller"); and
(3) a portion of initial value is subjected to the risks of an enterprise, it being
sufficient if-
(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest in, or debt-
holder claim against, the enterprise, or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use by the enter-
prise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of such property,
or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present value is
determined by taking into account the anticipated but unrealized success
of the enterprise, even though the buyer has no legal relationship with
the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the operations of
the enterprise or does not receive the right to participate in the management of the
enterprise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises or representa-
tions which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, over and above initial value, will accrue to the buyer as a result of the
operation of the enterprise.
Id. (footnote omitted).
52 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 1257-58.
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definitional issue arose in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman,54 in which it was held that shares in a nonprofit cooperative
housing project are not securities. By relying chiefly upon the ab-
sence of any expectation of profits on the part of the purchas-
ers-who, according to the Court, were interested primarily in ac-
quiring adequate low-cost housing 55-the Forman decision injected
new vitality into the Howey formula56 and solidified its role as con-
trolling authority in identifying an investment contract. Of neces-
sity, this reaffirmation of the Howey standard has influenced subse-
quent decisions of other courts faced with the definitional question,
whether involving the proper interpretation of "stock," "note," or
"investment contradt." 57 Soon after the Forman decision the Second
Circuit, in Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.,5" was
presented with an opportunity to consider the definitional issue. In
that case, three promissory notes had been transferred by a stock
brokerage firm to secure a loan from the plaintiff bank." The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the notes evidenced an
ordinary commercial loan not subject to the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
- 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Numerous commentators have discussed Forman and its impact
on the definitional issue. See, e.g., 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 849; 9 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 206 (1975); 54
N.C.L. Rav. 731 (1976).
0 421 U.S. at 851. Defining profit as "capital appreciation" or a "participation in earn-
ings resulting from the use of investors' funds," the Court refused to recognize as profits
reduced rental charges or tax benefits realized as a result of ownership of co-op shares. Id. at
852-55. Acknowledging that income from commercial leases is a type "of profit traditionally
associated with a security investment," the Court went on to hold that income received by
the co-op corporation from the leasing of various commercial facilities was too insubstantial
and speculative "to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts." Id. at 855-56.
m' See 54 N.C.L. Rxv. 731 (1976), wherein it is pointed out that "[tihe Court's principal
tool for distinguishing a security from other interests is the test developed in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co ..... Forman refined the test so that now a transaction comes within the defini-
tional sections . . . whenever investors are motivated to risk their capital by a significant,
realistic expectation of substantial profits. . . to come solely from the efforts of others." Id.
at 732-33 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
51 See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976)
(promissory notes held to be securities); Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976) (shares in private cooperative apartment held not to be securi-
ties). Although the Exchange court failed to see the relevance of the Howey formula in the
context of promissory notes since the test was fashioned specifically to cover situations involv-
ing investment contracts, the Second Circuit nevertheless adhered to the anti-literalist ap-
proach of Forman by holding that the express language of the statute controls unless it is
established by one of the parties that "the context otherwise requires." 544 F.2d at 1137. See
notes 58-65 and accompanying text infra.
- 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
51 Id. at 1128. The complaint alleged that the brokerage firm's financial statements,
certified by the defendant, were materially false and misleading and that the defendant knew
or should have known this fact. The firm eventually was forced into receivership, and the
notes became worthless. Id.
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Framing its examination of the issue around the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language, the Second Circuit ruled that the
party attempting to show that a note is not a security has the bur-
den of proving that the context in which the note was issued re-
moves it from the operation of the securities law.6" In reaching its
conclusion that defendant Touche Ross failed to satisfy this burden,
the panel declined to adhere to any previously delineated test for
evaluating the status of a particular instrument as a security; in-
stead, the court formulated its own test based primarily not on a
view toward what a security is but on what it is not. Stating that
certain types of notes clearly were not intended by Congress to fall
within the coverage of the 1934 Act,6' the Second Circuit concluded
that any note "bearing a strong family resemblance" to these ex-
cluded notes should likewise be deemed without the scope of the
statute. Since the notes in question were more closely akin to in-
vestment instruments than unregulated commercial instruments,
the provisions of the 1934 Act were held to be applicable." While
the Exchange panel purported to reject the Howey test as irrelevant
in promissory note situations, 4 it is submitted that the Exchange
test is, in essence, a context-over-text approach: Congressional in-
tent was the focal point of analysis, and an investment-commercial
dichotomy was pivotal to the Court's ultimate determination.65
1.
61 Id. at 1137-38. The Second Circuit's decision in Exchange seems contrary to previously
well-recognized precepts concerning the burden of proof in securities cases. By holding that
the burden of proof is on the party asserting that an item is not a security, the court contra-
dicted the principle that the person invoking federal jurisdiction, i.e., the plaintiff, must
establish it by proving the purchase or sale of a security. See Note, Bank Loans as Securities,
51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 440, 443 n.15 (1977).
61 The court listed consumer financing notes, home mortgage notes, secured short-term
loans to small businesses, "character" loans to bank customers, short-term notes secured by
accounts receivable, and notes which merely formalize open-account debts "incurred in the
ordinary course of business," as representative of those notes which do not fall within coverage
of the securities acts. 544F.2d at 1138.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1138-39. Many factors influenced the Second Circuit's ultimate holding that the
notes in question were securities. The subordination of the notes to claims of other general
creditors, the use of the proceeds as "equity capital," and the absence of collateral were
viewed by the court as particularly indicative of an investment transaction. This conclusion
has been criticized by one student author who viewed the notes in Exchange as commercial
rather than investment in light of tests utilized by other courts. See Note, Bank Loans as
Securities, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 440, 449-52 (1977).
544 F.2d at 1136-37.
The Exchange "family resemblance" test is examined in Pollock, supra note 4, at 545-
47, wherein the author labeled it the "purpose" test. According to this commentator,
"[a]lthough the court never discussed the meaning directly, its language throughout the
opinion made clear that it was reading 'unless the context otherwise requires' to mean 'unless
the context otherwise requires to carry out the purposes of the securities acts.' " Id. at 546
PROMISSORY NOTES
THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY AND FLEXIBILITY
The decision whether to characterize a particular note as a
security is extremely significant, as ultimate rights and remedies are
influenced by it. Most importantly, labeling a promissory note as a
security affords a defrauded claimant access to the federal courts.
A plaintiff who is able to pursue his cause of action in a federal
forum under the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act receives signifi-
cant substantive and procedural benefits.66 Procedurally, a number
of factors accentuate the attractiveness of the federal court system,
ranging from the initial advantages of liberal in personam jurisdic-
tion and venue requirements in the 19.34 Act"7 to the fact that a
judgment rendered in the action is enforceable nationwide." Of cru-
cial importance as well are the substantive advantages of a federal
cause of action. Application of the Securities Exchange Act in many
cases facilitates a defrauded plaintiff's recovery. A plaintiff com-
mencing a rule 10b-5 suit, for example, may select his adversary
from a potentially larger class of individuals since the plaintiff need
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Under this analysis, every note would be covered
by the securities laws unless it could be shown that no congressional purpose would be
furthered by the application of those statutes. Although this commentator expressed his
preference for the purpose test when applied in light of congressional intent, he went on to
note that even this test may result in subjective, arbitrary decisions if courts do not frame a
properly narrow statement of congressional purpose. Id. at 547. For a brief analysis of
Exchange, see 30 VAND. L. REV. 110 (1977), wherein it is suggested that a listing of commercial
note transactions should be compiled and that "all notes [should be] presumed to be securi-
ties unless [they fit] within one of the enumerated examples of commercial note transac-
tions." Id. at 120-21.
" See Hammett, supra note 12, at 30-35. While application of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
may benefit an aggrieved claimant, it imposes substantial duties upon the maker of an
instrument. Pursuant to § 5 of the 1933 Act, the issuer of a promissory note which is consid-
ered a security would have to comply with the Act's often expensive and time-consuming
registration requirements. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); 54 N.C.L.
REV. 731 (1976). Section 3 of the 1933 Act, however, exempts certain promissory notes from
the registration requirements. See Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970).
Failure to comply with the registration requirements where a nonexempt security is involved
may lead to the imposition of harsh sanctions. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12, 15, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 771, 77o.
17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) provides in part:
Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transac-
tion constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability
or duty created by this chapter. . ., or to enjoin any violation. . ., may be brought
in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any
other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant
may be found.
See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759 (5th Cir. 1974).
Is See Hammett, supra note 12, at 30-31, 31 nn.29-30.
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not be in privity with the party guilty of the misrepresentation." In
addition, it is not necessary that there be an agency relationship
between the potential defendant and the person who made the mis-
representation; rather, liability may be imposed upon those who are
in "control" of the violators of the Act."0 Moreover, the permissibil-
ity of imposing 10b-5 liability for encouraging or aiding the defraud-
ing of an investor is in marked contrast to common law principles. 7'
Another advantage of the 10b-5 fraud action permits the maker
of a note, as seller, to seek redress against payees, whereas state
blue-sky laws traditionally permit only purchasers to recover.72
Greater ease of recovery under the 1934 Act also is assured by a
burden of proof less exacting than the one customarily imposed
upon a plaintiff in a common law fraud action;73 while at common
" Promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
70 Under common law principles, an agency relationship is a condition precedent to the
imposition of liability upon individuals who have not personally consummated a fraudulent
transaction. Pursuant to provisions of the 1934 Act, however, an aggrieved claimant may
maintain an action against a much larger group of defendants. See Gottleib v. Sandia Am.
Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 516 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971). This expansion of liability
is a result of § 20(a) of the 1934 Act which provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provi-
sion of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 7St(a) (1970). By liberally construing the words "controlling person," the courts
have enhanced the distinction between the 1934 Act and the common law rule. Although the
term has not yet been defined with precision, it is clear that something less than a strict
agency relationship will suffice as a prerequisite to liability under § 20(a). See, e.g., Ayers v.
Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759-61 (5th Cir. 1974); Ayers v.
Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 13-15 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, The Status of the
Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 175, 177 n.14.
2 See Commercial Notes, supra note 22.
11 See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960); Whitlow & Assocs. v. Intermountain Brokers, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 943,
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law a claimant must establish specific reliance upon the defendant's
misstatements or omissions as a prerequisite to recovery, under rule
10b-5 a plaintiff need only show that the misrepresentations were
material. 4 Lastly, a 10b-5 claimant is afforded the advantages in-
herent in the 1934 Act's anti-waiver provisions75 together with the
benefits of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7" and liberal discov-
ery techniques.77 With these major substantive and procedural ad-
vantages at stake, there is little doubt that an individual claiming
to have been defrauded in a transaction involving the exchange of
a promissory note would much prefer the opportunity to seek relief
in a federal forum, the availability of which is dependent upon the
classification of a promissory note as a security.78
947 (D. Haw. 1966); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 993 (S.D.
Fla. 1963).
71 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) wherein the Court
stated:
[Plositive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of this decision. This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of
causation in fact.
Id. at 153-54 (citation omitted). See Simon v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
482 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1973); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Hammett, supra note 12, at 32; Notes as Securities, supra note
11, at 233 n.4; Commercial Notes, supra note 22, at 505.
Although some authorities indicated that a plaintiff could predicate a private damage
action upon negligent misstatements under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), definitively held that scienter is a
requisite element in such a suit. The Court in Hochfelder reasoned that the language of
section 10(b) proscribes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive investors and that
therefore liability may not be imposed upon a defendant absent a showing of scienter. See
generally Van Graafeiland, Foreword: A Lawyer's Observations on Hochfelder, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 239 (1977).
11 Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act invalidates "[any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby .... " 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(a) (1970). In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), a similar provision of the Securities
Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970), was held to negate a binding arbitration clause
contained within a broker-customer agreement.
" The pleading, joinder, and class action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are generally more liberal and less formal than those which prevail in many state forums.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 3-16, 18-21, 23.
1 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26-37.
13 It is important to note that the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are
constitutionally predicated upon the direct or indirect use of an "instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails .... " Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1970). See Olympic Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646, 653 (C.D. Cal. 1967); SEC
v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1963). Hence, the mere
existence of a promissory note characterizable as a security alone does not create a basis for
federal jurisdiction.
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Since the decisions in McClure and Lino, the crucial task con-
fronting the judiciary and practitioners had been to distinguish
satisfactorily an investment note from a commercial note. The ab-
sence of congressional guidance in this area has placed a tremen-
dous burden upon individuals who are possibly subject to the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts by virtue of a given
exchange or transaction. Because the Supreme Court has not yet
rendered a decision directly addressing the promissory note issue,
no clear basis for drawing this distinction has been available. Al-
though analogies have been drawn between cases involving notes
and those involving investment contracts or stock, the latter cases
may be considered no more than persuasive authority." The un-
fortunate result has been that the determination whether a given
promissory note is a security has depended, to some extent, upon
the relative importance attached by a particular court to the factors
considered."0
The tests propounded thus far have failed to provide a predicta-
ble and uniform solution to the uncertainty surrounding the status
of promissory notes as securities .8 Sporadic employment of one or
"' Many recent cases addressing the definitional issue have arisen in contexts other than
that of a promissory note transaction. See, e.g., McGovery Plaza Joint Venture v. First of
Denver Mortgage Investors, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,191
(10th Cir. Oct. 4, 1977) (neither a construction loan commitment nor permanent loan com-
mitment were securities under 1933 and 1934 Acts); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,167 (7th Cir. Sept. 6, 1977)
(discretionary trading account did not constitute investment contract since investor's funds
were not pooled with those of other investors); Robinson v. UMW Health & Retirement
Funds, 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977) (interest in pension or health plan is not a security);
Sullivan v. Chase Investor Serv., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (purchase of invest-
ment advisory services is not an investment contract); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (cattle lease agreement and calf maintenance agreement constituted
investment contract where investor paid in advance for lease of pregnant cow and mainte-
nance expenses as incurred); Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp.
541 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (involuntary noncontributory employee pension fund is a security), noted
in 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 591 (1977); 22 VuL. L. REv. 195 (1976).
See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976)
(applying family resemblance text); Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1009 (1976) (economic realities emphasized); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (risk capital employed as determinative factor).
" The shortcomings of the economic realities, risk capital, and purpose tests are dis-
cussed in Pollock, supra note 4, at 541-47. In discussing the risk capital test, Pollock criticized
the Great Western court for the unpredictability of its approach. In particular, he argued that
"[olne of the principal weaknesses of the risk capital test . . . is that the court offers no
workable guidelines to determine what level of risk will be sufficient to convert a non-security
note into a security. Consequently, the test is impossible to apply in a predictable manner."
Id. It should be noted, however, that the Great Western court did not hold any single factor
to be dispositive of the issue. Rather, it sought to differentiate between two somewhat nebu-
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more of these suggested criteria has served only to increase the
existing confusion. Unfortunately, no court has attempted to ana-
lyze the definitional problem in light of all the pertinent elements.2
A method of analysis which incorporates all of the factors isolated
by the courts would seem to provide a framework within which a
more meaningful evaluation of the status of promissory notes may
be conducted. While the indefiniteness which now characterizes the
standards applied by the federal courts may not be entirely eradi-
cated through such an approach, it is suggested that an overly con-
crete mode of analysis would deprive the courts of that flexibility
which is indispensable in this area of the law. Due to the variety of
contexts in which instruments might be involved, a formula which
leaves some discretion in the hands of the judiciary appears neces-
sary;" a precise, overly-rigid rule would seem less workable than
those tests which presently exist. 4 It is submitted that a proper
mode of analysis would be predicated upon the basic assumption
that the economic realities of the transaction should govern the
applicability of the federal securities laws. Each controversy there-
fore must be examined on an individual basis. While not definable
in precise terms," the factors that should be considered may be
lous concepts-risk capital and risky loan. 532 F.2d at 1257. The court recognized that "[iun
one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places his money at risk in anticipation
of a profit in the form of interest. Also. . . every investor lends his money to a borrower who
uses it for a price and is expected to return it one day." Id., (citing C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc.
v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)).
While there always may be some uncertainty as to whether a particular transaction warrants
application of federal securities laws, the pertinent question is whether the risk inherent in
the transaction goes beyond that normally associated with the lending of money for a period
of time. The Ninth Circuit has attempted to set forth certain criteria to be considered in
evaluating whether a given promissory note was "in economic reality a 'security,' received in
exchange for the payee's 'investment.'" 532 F.2d at 1257.
The approach utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532
F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976), most closely epitomizes an all-inclusive standard. See notes 86-
109 and accompanying text infra.
1 The Supreme Court has stated that Congress sought to frame the definition of "the
term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition
the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept
of a security." United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (citing H.R.
REp. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)).
I" Under an inflexible rule, for example, it is quite possible for a particular note to be
characterized incorrectly. See note 112 infra. Compare Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross
& Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976) (notes evidencing bank loans afforded security status),
with McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930
(1975) (notes given in connection with bank loans summarily denied security status).
" As one author has written: "It would be misleading to suggest that such an inquiry
can ever be summarized in a neat formula or a short list of guidelines." Comment, The Status
of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 Amiz. ST. L.J. 175, 192 (1975).
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culled from the numerous cases addressing the definitional problem.
Focusing on these criteria, courts can determine whether particular
transactions deserve the protection of the securities laws. This type
of analysis is typified by the Ninth Circuit opinion in Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz.8
Beginning with the notion that the presence or absence of any
single factor should not be dispositive of the promissory note issue,
the Great Western court reasoned that "[w]hen all factors together
are brought to bear" the transaction viewed in its entirety will re-
veal the note to be either investment or commercial in nature.87
Although it highlighted the question whether the payee has contrib-
uted risk capital subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others, the court also considered the time of maturity of the note,
the extent of collateralization, the form of the obligation, the cir-
cumstances of issuance, the size of the borrower's business relative
to the amount borrowed, and the contemplated use of the funds.8
It is suggested, however, that the risk element should not be overem-
phasized to the exclusion of other factors, and that the inquiry thus
should be directed towards the investment-commercial dichotomy
with the risk element being only one of many factors examined. 9
Among the considerations that are relevant in determining
whether a particular note should be deemed a security is the name
which appears upon the face of the instrument. Hence, the charac-
terization of an instrument on financial statements as a security
may be indicative of an investment-oriented transaction. Likewise
relevant is the number and value amount of the notes which are
issued.' The exchange of a single note as part of an isolated transac-
tion tends to suggest a personal or commercial climate, whereas
investment notes frequently are issued in large numbers" and gener-
532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
', Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1257-58.
Several recent cases have employed the investment-commercial test and, relying heav-
ily upon the absence of a profit motive, have concluded that particular promissory notes were
intended to be cash substitutes and as such did not constitute securities. See, e.g., EMISCO
Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1976); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp.
309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1029, 1030-31 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
10 See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972). In support of its holding that certain promissory notes were securities within
the meaning of the securities laws, the Sanders court observed that the notes were referred
to as "short term open market paper" in the issuer's financial statements. 463 F.2d at 1079.
, See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976).
" Several decisions holding promissory notes to be within the coverage of the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts have involved public offerings. See, e.g., Llanos v. United
States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954).
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ally sold to a class consisting of many relatively sophisticated pay-
ees. The extent of collateralization also should be given weight in
evaluating a promissory note transaction, since an unsecured lender
certainly assumes a higher degree of risk. Furthermore, tremendous
risk is present when the amount borrowed is a figure significantly
in excess of the value of the borrower's business.93 Should the payee
of the note be afforded certain benefits normally arising only in the
investment arena, such as the right to inspect the books and records
of the issuer's enterprise, in return for which the payee assumes
increased risk, the transaction is more likely to involve a security. 4
Such indicia are useful in distinguishing between what the Great
Western court described as the risky loan and risk capital. 5
The manner in which promissory notes are to be repaid sheds
additional light upon whether the particular note should be viewed
as a security. Should the issuer's repayment be contingent upon the
earning of potential profits or should the debt actually be payable
solely out of projected earnings, an investment transaction would be
evidenced. One should also consider whether the payee is familiar
with the nature and operations of the issuer's business; a lack of
familiarity gives rise to a significantly increased risk factor. 7 The
use to which a borrower puts the proceeds of a loan also should not
be overlooked. 8 If the proceeds are merely expended on current
business operations or used to acquire consumer products, the trans-
" See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1228(9th Cir. 1976) (citing C.N.S.
Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975)).
11 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 (1967), wherein instruments found
to be securities conferred voting rights upon the payees. See generally Commercial Notes,
supra note 22, at 516-17.
11 532 F.2d at 1257-58. The risk capital approach recently was employed by the Ninth
Circuit in United Cal. Bank v. THC Financial Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,125 (9th Cir. July 25, 1977). The court found that a corporation's agree-
ment to purchase on demand all notes taken by a bank as security for advances extended to
another business did not constitute a security. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that
no risk capital had been involved since the risk accompanying the notes was equivalent to
the risk associated with the lending of any money for a period of time. Interestingly, the court
explained that the risk capital test encompasses an economic realities standard as well as a
Howey-type requirement that profits be expected to result from the entrepreneurial efforts
of others. Summarizing its holding, the court stated that "participations or notes evidencing
'risk capital,' i.e., risk of non-payment, are securities while those evidencing 'risky loans' are
not." Id. at 92,061.
" See Commercial Notes, supra note 22, at 517.
See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L., Rav. 367, 377 (1967), quoted in note 51 supra.
11 See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976). The Great Western
court emphasized this factor as an element to be weighed in the risk capital balancing process.
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action most likely is not within the purview of the securities law.99
If the proceeds are utilized to finance the underlying capital founda-
tion of an enterprise, however, the possibility that the note is a
security is greatly enhanced. Related to this consideration is a no-
tion frequently referred to as "transaction impetus." In general,
advocates of this theory argue that a security transaction rarely
exists when the purchaser initiated the dealings with the issuer. 0
In other words, a note is more likely to represent an investment
when the origins of the transaction can be traced back to the efforts
of the issuer.'0' This argument has been criticized, however, since "a
private party may also have surplus funds which need investment,
and may initiate a financial transaction resulting in the acquisition
of corporate securities."'102 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the ori-
gin of the transfer should be considered along with the other avail-
able criteria.
Negotiability of an instrument may also give evidence of the
nature of the note in some circumstances, although this element
should not be overly emphasized since negotiable securities are now
quite common in the financial arena. 1 3 The term of the note in
question also should be examined, as short term obligations are very
likely to be simple commercial instruments not subject to federal
regulation."4 Whether the issuer of a contested instrument deals
" See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359-60
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) (notes given as payment for consumer goods are
not securities); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975) (promissory notes utilized merely for commercial purposes are not securi-
ties).
.. The transaction impetus notion was alluded to in decisions by both the Ninth and
the Seventh Circuits. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.5 (9th Cir.
1976); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972).
101 See Comment, The Status of Promissory Notes Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 175.
0 Great W. Bank & Trust v Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976).
,o1 See id.; Commercial Notes, supra note 22, at 522 n.165.
101 It is quite likely that neither short-term promissory notes nor demand notes qualify
as securities. See Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). But see Zeller v. Bogue
Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). The Zeller court
determined that where an issuer effectively can prevent demand by the purchaser, the de-
mand note may be deemed a security. Id. at 799. In contrast, long-term notes often are found
to be securities. Therefore, it is important to examine the time span between issuance and
maturity when a note is payable on a specified future date. See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey
Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), the plaintiff had been fraudulently induced into
exchanging its long-term promissory notes for the assets of another corporation. In holding
that the entire transaction involved the exchange of a security, the court emphasized, inter
alia, the 20-year term of the notes. Id. at 663.
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personally with the payee on a face-to-face basis is another sugges-
tive factor, since securities frequently are issued through neutral
third parties with the national exchanges serving as the medium for
the transfer.' 5
Finally, it may prove valuable to examine the aforementioned
factors against the backdrop of the criteria expressly enunciated by
the Howey Court"0 6 and refined in the Forman decision.'0 To that
end, an evaluation should be made concerning whether the transac-
tion involved the transfer of money or other articles of value' ° to-
ward a common enterprise'0' and whether the purchaser's primary
motivation for entering into the exchange was the expectation of a
benefit generated substantially through the efforts of the issuer or
a third party,"10 and not merely the desire to obtain a commodity.",
An obvious corollary to the mode of analysis herein suggested
is that the classification of entire transaction groups as either in-
10' Compare Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (private transaction
held not to be regulated by the 1933 and 1934 Acts), with SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.), modified on other grounds, 285 F.2d 162 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (public offering held to be governed by the
securities acts).
"1 328 U.S. at 298-99. It should be noted that one court has expressly rejected Howey as
irrelevant to the promissory note situation, see note 57 supra, while another court has adopted
the Howey formula in toto as the appropriate'standard to be applied, see note 114 infra.
,o 421 U.S. at 852.
,0 In addition to money, assets have been recognized as consideration for promissory
notes. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (promise
to refrain from instituting a legal action held sufficient consideration for the issuance of a
note deemed a security); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (land constituted
consideration for a promissory note which qualified as a security).
,0' The common enterprise element is discussed in Hammett, supra note 12, at 65-70.
,, In contrast to the Howey Court, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Supreme Court in United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), did not state that the benefit must be
derived solely from the efforts of third parties. Thus, it now appears that the test is satisfied
if the benefits are generated substantially by the efforts of others. Compare United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975), with SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946). Supporting this reading of Forman is the fact that the solely requirement
has been abandoned by many lower courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (pyramid investment scheme
whereby efforts of the investors themselves affected amount of profits received held an invest-
ment contract).
I The Supreme Court's holding in Forman was based in part upon a finding that a
purchaser's primary motivation in acquiring shares of stock in a public cooperative develop-
ment is the acquisition of adequate low-cost housing and not the expectation of a benefit.
421 U.S. at 851. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976), held that shares in a privately-owned cooperative develop-
ment did not constitute securities, emphasizing that the purchasers of the cooperative apart-
ments were primarily interested in obtaining residences and that any profit motives were
merely incidental. For a discussion of the Grenader decision, see Note, Shares in Private
Cooperative Apartment Held Not to Be Securities, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 428 (1977).
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vestment or commercial is imprecise and should be avoided. Bank
loans, for instance, should not be characterized immediately as
commercial without further scrutiny;"2 instead, these transactions
must be individually analyzed and all circumstances surrounding
each exchange carefully examined."' It is submitted that the major
concern in each case ultimately must be whether the legislature
intended to provide a particular claimant with a federal remedy.
Any facet of the transaction which may aid in the resolution of this
question certainly should be included in the analysis.
CONCLUSION
Given the need for uniformity and flexibility, it would seem
that an overly rigid test for determining the applicability of the 1933
and 1934 Acts to cases involving the transfer of promissory notes is
neither mandated nor desirable. While an examination of the legis-
lative history of both Acts appears to reveal that only investment
instruments were intended to be subject to the provisions of the
securities law, the absence of legislative guidance with respect to the
definition of an investment transaction has led to difficulty in im-
plementing this policy. Moreover, the failure of the federal courts
to develop a uniform approach in this area has impaired the practi-
tioner's ability to predict whether a particular promissory note will
be treated as a security.114
"I In the Fifth Circuit, bank loans have been held to be commercial transactions not
subject to the operation of the securities acts. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). Such an inflexible approach may lead to
clearly improper results. See, e.g., Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
In Bellah, the plaintiffs had borrowed money from the defendant bank for the purpose of
developing an existing livestock business. The court-dismissed the Bellahs' complaint, which
alleged material misrepresentations by the bank in the loan agreement, on the ground that
the notes were not securities. Although evidence existed that the Bellahs and the bank were
engaged in a common enterprise characteristic of a security transaction, according to one
commentator the court "felt compelled to view commercial loans as nonsecurity transactions
to avoid subjecting commercial paper to the registration provisions of the 1933 Act." Com-
ment, The Status of Promissory Notes Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J.
175, 187.
"I Legal analysts should consider other proposed definitions of the term security and
should not limit their inquiry only to factors herein examined. Thus, the Uniform Commercial
Code definition of a security may be useful in determining whether a particular promissory
note is a security. Under the Code, unless the context otherwise requires, a security is any
instrument issued in bearer or registered form which is of a type commonly recognized as
traded in securities markets or exchanges or any medium for investment, and which is one
of a class or series or else is divisible by its terms into a class or series of instruments and
which evidences a share, participation or interest in an enterprise or an obligation of the
issuer. See U.C.C. § 8-102 (1972 version) (emphasis added).
"I Much litigation continues to address the troublesome issue of the status of promissory
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To remedy this problem, it is suggested that the federal courts
adopt the method proposed herein for use in distinguishing invest-
ment from commercial transactions and place no arbitrary limita-
tion upon the factors which may be considered. Such an approach
would provide the necessary flexibility as well as assure that all
courts would be considering the same criteria in making their deter-
minations, namely all the elements of the transaction in question.
Until an all-inclusive standard is utilized by the courts, flexibility
and uniformity will not be achieved and litigants will be faced with
unpredictable application of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Joseph C. Petillo
Denise M. Dalton
notes as securities. See, e.g., Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1977); Lincoln
Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,637 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (mem.); Tri-County State Bank v. Hertz, 418 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Pa. 1976); Fund
of Funds, Ltd. v. Vesco, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,644
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In the Lincoln Nat'l Bank and Tri-County State Bank decisions, the
commercial-investment standard was applied to promissory notes given in exchange for bank
loans, with both courts concluding that the notes in question were not securities. In contrast,
the Oliver court stated that a note is a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
if it meets the Howey test for determining whether an investment contract is a security. 426
F. Supp. at 1085-86. Despite its finding that the plaintiffs did expect a profit, i.e., interest
on the note, the Oliver court held that the notes, which were received by the plaintiffs in
exchange for certain shares of stock, did not constitute securities. In view of the fact that
"[bly the sale of their stock to the defendant in exchange for the latter's note, plaintiffs
sought to terminate their investment ... , [they] were not 'investing' in any sense of the
word . . . [but] were seeking to take their money out of the common enterprise." Id. at 1087
(emphasis in original). In light of these recent decisions, it is submitted, the need for a
uniform, all-inclusive standard is manifest.
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